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Innovations in Support of the Unitary
Injury Test in U.S. Unfair Trade Cases
Richard D. Boltuck*
I. Introduction
Unfair trade allegations fall into .two categories: dumping and countervailable subsi-
dies.' The right of the General Agreement on Tariffs on Trade (GATT) signatory nations
to collect antidumping duties and countervailing duties intended to remedy (that is, offset
the trade effects of) foreign unfair practices is set out in Article VI of the GATT, together
with the Antidumping Code2 and the Subsidies Code.3
Dumping is the practice of selling in an export market at prices that are below fair
value, i.e. those charged in the producing firm's home market, or at prices that are less than
production cost.4 Countervailable subsidies arise when export subsidies, or domestic pro-
duction subsidies, encourage an expansion of exports.
* [This paper is being reprinted with the permission of Cambridge University Press, copyright,
1998, Cambridge University Press.]
This research was supported by funds payable through Duquesne University Law School and the
Law and Economics Center at George Mason University Law School. The views expressed are the
author's alone, and do not necessarily reflect those of Trade Resources Company or any other
person associated with Trade Resources Company. Finally, the author would like to thank Paul
Zucker for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
1. Whether unfair trade practices are, in any sense, unfair or unethical need not be resolved in order
to appreciate the significance of international agreement against these practices. By offering a
safety valve for industries that seek protection, unfair trade remedies contribute to the political
feasibility of GATT's broader multilateral trade liberalizing theme. By limiting remedial mea-
sures to instances where certain factual preconditions are demonstrated in an extensive investiga-
tion, at least some industries that would otherwise win protection through direct political means
are turned away. In addition, the extent of the protection granted is restricted by the magnitude
of the dumping margin or subsidy rate, as determined in the investigation.
2. Formally, the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trad, Apr. 12,1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.), at 171 (1980).
3. Formally, the Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, GATT B.l.S.D. (26th Supp.), at 56 (1980).
4. For the purpose of comparison, prices or costs are measured at the producing company's factory
gate. If the home market is found to be not viable under applicable tests, prices to third country
markets are used to establish fair value. If neither the home market nor third country markets
are found to be viable, then fair value is based on a measure of constructed production costs. If
the country under investigation is a non-market economy (NME), then surrogate country factor
costs are used to establish a constructed production cost.
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Generally, antidumping (AD) or countervailable subsidy (CVD) investigations are ini-
tiated following receipt by the administering government authorities of a petition pre-
pared by a domestic industry. The petition must contain the appropriate allegations and
assertions of fact. Before the authorities may issue remedial orders, two findings must be
reached:
* First, the alleged unfair practice, or others identified by the authorities, must be
occurring, and the magnitude of the dumping margin or subsidy rate5 must not
be de minimus.
* Second, the practice must be causing material injury to a domestic industry pro-
ducing the product or products that are like the subject imports. The U.S. indus-
try must be determined to be "materially injured by reason of" the imports that
are subject to investigation. 6
The focus of this paper is on the appropriate economic methodology to support
application of the material injury test under the but-for approach to injury.7 Section II
sets out in general terms the U.S. experience with the injury test, including developments
over the past several years. During this period, economic methods that rely on compara-
tive static price-theoretic economic models were introduced in both AD and CVD investi-
gations.
Section III details two innovations in economic modelling that contribute to more
precise analysis in both AD and CVD investigations. The first innovation permits exami-
nation of the significance of U.S. export markets in CVD investigations. The second inno-
vation is based on a recent economic submission before the International Trade
Commission (ITC), and extends the analysis of the impact of dumping to oligopolistic
market structures in the United States. Finally, Section IV offers concluding thoughts.
5. The dumping margin or subsidy rate is measured as a percentage of the U.S. import price. The
U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, is responsible for determin-
ing the dumping margin or subsidy rate.
6. The AD law also requires that a remedial order be issued if a U.S. industry is determined to be
suffering a real threat of imminent injury from future subject imports, or if a U.S. industry is
materially retarded in its development and growth because of subject imports. As a practical
matter, material retardation is virtually never an issue in U.S. AD investigations. The remainder
of this paper addresses the current injury test, and does not further discuss threat or material
retardation.
7. Throughout this paper, references are to the injury test as applied in the United States, and with
respect to subject imported merchandise. The analytical methods presented are generally applic-
able in the administration of unfair trade laws in other countries as well.
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II. The U.S. Experience With Competing Approaches to the
Injury Determination.
The injury test in the U.S. unfair trade statutes is administered by the U.S. ITC, an
independent quasi-judicial entity comprised of six commissioners. 8 To promote indepen-
dence and impartiality, positions on the Commission are divided between members of the
major political parties, although nominees are also occasionally independent of any politi-
cal affiliation. 9 Similarly, the Commission's chairmanship alternates between members
affiliated with different parties.
The Commission is split into two factions that apply sharply distinct methodological
approaches in assessing whether the U.S. industry is materially injured. These approaches
are called the bifurcated (or trends) approach and the unitary (or but for) approach.' 0
Interestingly, the two factions have co-existed for over a decade, and have not generally
aligned along political party lines. Regardless of approach, commissioners must determine
individually whether the amount of injury suffered by the industry surpasses his or her
inherently subjective "materiality" threshold.'I
The unitary approach asks whether the U.S. industry would have been materially bet-
ter off "but for" the sales of dumped or subsidized imported merchandise. If so, then the
industry is materially injured by reason of the imports. Thus, this approach compares the
condition of the U.S. industry in the presence of "unfair" imports with an analytic estimate
of the condition of the industry were such imports absent.
Commissioners who most rigorously apply the unitary approach have generally
expressly interpret the counterfactual absence of dumped or subsidized imports to be
equivalent to the absence of the underlying unfair foreign trade practice itself, i.e., dump-
8. The current members are Chairman Peter Watson, Vice Chairman Janet Nuzum, and
Commissioners Carol Crawford, David Rohr, Donald Newquist, and Lyn Bragg.
9. Commissioner Susan Liebeler who served in the mid- 1980s was a political independent.
10. For an excellent discussion of the various approaches used both currently and historically by ITC
commissioners, see Seth Kaplan, Injury and Causation in US ITC Antidumping Determinations:
Five Recent Approaches, " in POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF ANTIDUMPING MEASURES 143 (P.K.M.
Tharakan ed., 1991). Seth Kaplan is presently an economic consultant at Trade Resources
Company. See also The Cass/Eckes Debate on the Future of Injury Analysis at the International
Trade Commission, at the University Club, Washington, D.C. (July 17, 1990) (transcript available
from A.B.A.) for a lively exposition of the merits and weaknesses of both methodological
approaches by Ronald Cass and Al Eckes, former commissioners and proponents, respectively, of
the unitary and bifurcated approaches.
11. The AD and CVD statute defines "material injury" to be "harm which is not inconsequential,
immaterial, or unimportant."
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ing or countervailable subsidization.1 2 A competing interpretation is to define the com-
parative counterfactual to require the absence of all such merchandise from the U.S. mar-
ket, regardless of whether it would have been sold had import prices equalled fair value. 13
Plainly, removal of all subject imports from the U.S. market would necessarily confer a
greater benefit to the U.S. industry than simply requiring that any subject imports that are
sold be priced at fair value.14
12. Recently-retired Commissioner Anne Brunsdale, one of the most ardent advocates of the unitary
approach on the Commission, articulated the rationale most eloquently, by noting in New Steel
Rails from Japan, Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-557-559 (Preliminary),
ITC Pub. No. 2524, June 1992, at 43, that:
In determining whether a domestic industry is materially injured by reason of
dumped imports, I consider, as the statute directs, the volume of subject imports,
the effects of these imports on the price of the like product, and the effects on the
domestic industry producing the like product.* [Footnote:] *Ofcours, the elimi-
nation of the dumped imports could be accomplished by raising the price of those
imports to the point where they are no longer being dumped.
Id. (emphasis added).
13. Commissioner Watson applies the unitary approach, but has dearly stated that he does not assess
the impact of the unfair practice. For instance, in Softwood Lumberfrom Canada, Inv. No. 701-
TA-312 (First Remand), ITC Pub. No. 2689, October 1993, at 8, he joined Commissioners Rohr
and Newquist (who both apply the bifurcated approach), in indicating that:
In making this determination, we consider the impact of the unfairly traded
imports, and not just the effects of the unfair practice. We cannot therefore look
just to what would be the case if that 28 percent of supply were fairly traded.
Rather, we must consider what effect the 28 percent of supply that is unfairly
traded has on the domestic industry.
14. A hallmark distinction between commissioners who attribute injury to the imports themselves
and commissioners who attribute injury to the unfair practice, is that members of the latter
group have considered the magnitude of the margin of dumping in reaching their determina-
tions. Doing so is supported by compelling logic. This logic is recognized in the Uruguay
Round GATT Agreement on Revising article 3.4 of the ANTDUMPING CODE which includes, for
the first time, the magnitude of the dumping margin among the factors that must be considered
in evaluating material injury. This new requirement is also captured in the draft U.S. Uruguay
Round Implementing Legislation. The dilemma with which this development seemingly con-
fronts commissioners who have not conventionally attributed injury to the unfair practice has
been recognized by Commissioner Donald Newquist. See Implementation of the GATT
Uruguay Round Amendments to Title VII, mimeo, Prepared by the Staff of Don E. Newquist,
Chairman, U.S. International Trade Commission (undated), at 6-7. Commissioner Newquist is
among those commissioners who have believed that Congress intends that the ITC consider the
effects of the sales of the total volume of subject imports, not simply the effects attributable to
sales that occur because of the unfair practice. See New Steel Railsfrom Japan, Luxembourg, and
the United Kingdom, supra note 13. For a further discussion of the significance of introducing
the dumping margin among those factors that the ITC must consider, see Richard Boltuck, The
Injury Determination in U.S. Antidumping Law and Practice: The Impact of the Uruguay
Round, presentation delivered to a symposium organized by the Korean Trade Commission,
Seoul (June 28, 1994).
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Application of the unitary approach is generally supported by ITC staff-generated
estimates of the impact of dumping or countervailable subsidies on the U.S. market equi-
librium, that is, volume, price, and industry revenue effects. The estimates are obtained
through use of comparative static price-theoretic economic models, including principally
the Comparative Analysis of Domestic Industry Condition (CADIC) model in AD investi-
gations, I5 and the staff's newer Commercial Policy Analysis System (COMPAS) spread-
sheet model, in CVD investigations. 16 Both models are Armington-style partial-equilibri-
um models, and are solved through linearization. 17
By contrast, the bifurcated approach asks a sequence of two questions: first, is the U.S.
like product industry materially injured? That is, is the industry financially or otherwise
unhealthy, or in declining health? This first question is called the "injury test"18
If the industry is materially injured, the bifurcated approach then asks whether the
subject imports have made more than a de minimus contribution to the industry's condi-
tion: This second question is called the "causation" test, and applies a contributory causa-
tion standard. The contributory causation standard permits the great bulk of the legally
cognizable injury identified in the injury test to be caused by factors other than the subject
imports. The 1979 GATT Antidumping Code requires, however, that "the injuries caused
by other factors must not be attributed to the dumped imports' 19 The consistency of the
contributory causation standard with this GATT mandate has often been questioned,
although the matter has not been resolved before any GATT dispute resolution panel.
In evaluating injury, commissioners who apply the bifurcated approach typically place
considerable weight on the U.S. industry's financial condition, and trends in financial per-
formance, together with other industry performance trends. Sometimes, cross-sectoral
comparisons are used to support inferences about the health of the industry. In evaluating
causation, bifurcated-approach commissioners seek evidence that import trends are corre-
lated with declining industry health, and that the subject imports have undersold the
domestic product.
15. See Richard Boltuck, Assessing the Effects on the Domestic Indust7y of Price Dumping, in POLICY
IMPLICATIONS OF ANTIDUMPING MASURFES 99 (P.K.M. Tharakan ed., 1991) (for a full exposition of
the CADIC model).
16. For details regarding the COMPAS subsidy spreadsheet, see An Economic Analysis of the Effects
of Subsidies, mimeo, prepared by the Office of Economics, ITC, June 23, 1992 (especially the
Technical Appendix).
17. The Armington assumption is that consumers or industrial end users regard products as differ-
entiated based on national origin. For the seminal contribution to this literature, see P.S.
Armington, A Theory of Demand for Products Distinguished by Place of Production, in IMF STAFF
PAPERS, 159-176 (1969). Product differentiation arises because of any systematic quality or char-
acteristic differences among products from different countries, together with factors associated
with the transaction. Transaction factors include delivery time and reliability, warranty and after
service, product liability, and other such factors that attach intrinsically to acquisition of the
product and that prospective customers take into account
18. The term "injury test" is also used to refer generically to the entire injury determination, whether
derived from a unitary or a bifurcated analysis. Its meaning is apparent in context.
19. ANTIDUMPING CODE, art. 3.4 (1979). Similar language appears in the Uruguay Round text. The
House Ways and Means Committee's draft version of the U.S. Uruguay Round Implementing
Legislation, however, would explicitly legalize use of the contributory causation standard in U.S.
administrative practice, but apparently not to the exclusion of the unitary approach.
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Although the two methodological approaches are at logical odds with each other,
reflecting disparate and mutually inconsistent readings of the law, the U.S. Court of
International Trade (CIT), the ITC's appellate court, has deferred to commissioners who
have applied each approach. The unitary approach is currently under challenge before the
CIT in appeals by the U.S. steel industry. The steel petitioners assert in their appeal that
the CIT has approved only the contributory causation standard that underlies the bifurcat-
ed approach's causation test, to the exclusion of the unitary approach.
The analytically-based application of the unitary approach evolved over the past
decade. It was motivated in part by a plain-language interpretation of the statute that held
that the injury measured must be directly attributable to the subject imports. 20 But it was
also motivated in part by the development and popularization of the economic tools that
made simulation modelling a reasonably straightforward and transparent exercise.
Prior to the release of the first version of the CADIC model in 1987, Commissioner
Paula Stem had been the only recent member of the ITC to forcefully articulate commit-
ment to the unitary approach. Commissioner Stem, however, relied on an analytically
flawed method for assessing whether the imports had caused injury.2'
Reportedly, when the ITC's General Counsel reviewed the unitary approach in the
early 1980s, he concluded that although it was not illegal, it was practically infeasible to
implement. At the time, the prevailing view was that in order to measure the quantum of
injury correctly attributable to the subject imports alone, the effects of other known fac-
tors must be subtracted from the "total injury" endured by the industry. The residual
injury is then attributable to the imports. Such a subtraction approach is cumbersome at
20. Both the AD and CVD statutes require the ITC to determine that the material injury is "by rea-
son of" the subject imports. Moreover, neither statute, on its face, lays out or appears to contem-
plate a two-part test in reaching this determination.
Commissioner Carol Crawford, a commissioner who applies the unitary approach, notes in a
footnote to her determination in Certain Flat-Rolled Carbon Steel Products from Argentina, et al,
Inv. Nos. 701-TA-319-332, 334, 336-342, and 347-353 (Final) and Inv. Nos. 731-TA-573-579, 581-
592, 594-597, 599-609, and 612-619 (Final), Volume I: Determinations and Views of the
Commission, ITC Pub. 2664, August 1993, at 45, n.267, that:
The Commission is not to determine if the [subject] imports are "the principal, a
substantial or a significant cause of material injury." [citing the legislative history.
She then concludes that,] [rlather... [the Commission] is to determine whether
any injury "by reason of" the [subject] imports is material. That is, the
Commission must determine if the subject imports are causing material injury to
the domestic industry.
Id. (emphasis in the original).
21. Commissioner Stem used "margins analysis," which compared the size of the margin of under-
selling to the margin of dumping. If the margin of underselling was less than the margin of
dumping, causation was inferred. Her method properly recognized that any analysis of the
impact of the unfair practice would require consideration of the dumping margin or subsidy
rate. Nonetheless, a direct comparison of the margin of underselling to the dumping margin
does not properly reveal the effects of dumping. Indeed, a product sold at a lower price in the
United States because of dumping or subsidization can injure U.S. producers even if it oversells
the U.S. like product.
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best, and practically impossible to apply at worst As a result of this insight, the General
Counsel strongly advanced the bifurcated approach as a preferable alternative, chiefly
because the questions it poses may be defensibly answered within statutory time limits and
based on a typical investigative record.
The advent of comparative static modelling, which controls analytically for all factors
other than the imports to which injury must be attributed, increased the appeal of the uni-
tary approach significantly. Moreover, the models rely on a relatively sparse set of parame-
ters, including market shares, behavioral elasticities, and the dumping margin or subsidy
rate.22 Consequently, investigations, including written submissions by interested parties,
and hearing presentations, have focused increasingly on the limited array of factual issues
that inform judgments about reasonable, empirically-supported ranges for the required
parameters.
The models are constructed to be user friendly and portable. Parties to investigations
use the models to better assess the strength of their cases, and to direct their advocacy
toward the issues with the greatest potential benefit. Indeed, in ITC AD and CVD investi-
gations, the adversary process itself is designed around the application of comparative stat-
ic analysis.
For several years now, the ITC economics staff has prepared a prehearing memoran-
dum in each final investigation that sets out the staff's best judgment about reasonable
ranges in which parameters required for the modelling exercise are most likely to fall.
Parties generally offer comments at the hearing or in posthearing submissions about facts
that bear on these judgments. The staff considers and responds to these comments, some-
times revising its parameter range estimates, in a posthearing (final) economics memoran-
dum. This procedure enlists all of the interests represented in an investigation in a con-
certed effort to better evaluate the parameters needed to generate effects estimates.
Critics, who are frequently economists, often contend that the bifurcated approach is
intrinsically more "protectionist" than the unitary approach, or vice-versa. It is difficult to
sustain any strong position on this question, however, since any factual characterization of
the magnitude of cognizable injury under either approach must then be filtered through
the subjective materiality threshold, which is inherently individual to each commissioner.
The unitary and bifurcated approaches, though, do favor differing fact patterns. The
unitary approach, for instance, is more likely than the bifurcated approach to yield an
affirmative outcome when the U.S. industry is in good or improving financial condition.
Under such circumstances, the bifurcated approach necessarily finds a lack of injury, but
the unitary approach may still demonstrate that the industry would have been materially
22. The estimated impact on U.S. industry revenue is generally most sensitive to three parameters:(1) the margin of dumping or the subsidy rate; (2) the subject import penetration rate; and (3)
the difference between the Allen partial elasticity of substitution that relates the like product and
the subject import, and the absolute value of the composite demand elasticity. The second and
third of these parameters combine to imply the cross-price elasticity of demand for the like prod-
uct with respect to the price of the subject import. The first parameter is important in determin-
ing the magnitude of the price impact of the unfair practice on the U.S. price of the subject
import. The composition of the revenue effect between price and volume reductions is deter-
mined by the U.S. industry's production supply elasticity.
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better off but for the dumped or subsidized imports.23 The unitary approach also favors
an affirmative determination whenever the Commerce Department has reported a large
dumping margin or subsidy rate, regardless of whether the margin or rate reported reflects
actual unfair practices, or whether it reflects significant biases in the methodology applied
at Commerce.24
On the other hand, the bifurcated approach favors situations where the subject
imports have, in fact, contributed only slightly to the U.S. industry's poor or declining per-
formance. In such an instance, the contributory causation standard allows the effects asso-
ciated with numerous unrelated causes to be aggregated in assessing injury.25
Actual ITC outcomes depend substantially on the self-selection process that deter-
mines which industries will seek AD or CVD relief by filing petitions. Pursuing a claim
before the Department of Commerce and the ITC is an expensive undertaking, that gener-
ally requires use of legal counsel and consultants. The expected rewards to this expendi-
ture are greatest for industries that can offer facts that best match the approach used by at
23. For this reason, some protectionist interests have supported the unitary approach, even though,
in general, it has been embraced by commissioners who, individually, have been regarded as sym-
pathetic to more liberal trade practices. For example, according to an October 1991 study enti-
tled, Competing Economies: America, Europe, and the Pacific Rim, prepared by the
Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, at 150:
The injury test poses a particular problem for firms seeking relief in good eco-
nomic times, at the beginning of a product cycle, or before much damage has
been done. As the ITC has interpreted the test in some recent cases, industries
that appear fairly healthy in an absolute sense and whose health has not recently
declined will likely fail the injury test, even if they would have done far better if
not for the subsidized or dumped imports.... The majority approach can make it
hard for U.S. firms to win dumping cases early in a product cycle (when markets
are growing) or before significant damage has been done.
Id. This study generally endorsed protectionist policies in other contexts throughout, but cited
favorably those commissioners who assess injury "primarily in terms of the effect of the dumping,
rather than the general health of the industry." Id. (emphasis added).
24. See generally, DOWN IN THE DUMPS: ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNFAIR TRADE LAws (Richard Boltuck
& Robert E. Litan eds., 1991) for extended analysis of the many upward biases in the Commerce
Department's procedures for calculating dumping margins and subsidy rates. Numerous legal
representatives and consultants who represent or work for respondents before the ITC have
expressed concern that overstated margins or rates reported by the Commerce Department flow
through to the unitary approach at the ITC, and cause further unjustified determinations that are
adverse to the interest of foreign producers and importers.
25. Research by Keith Anderson, an economist in the office of former Chairman Anne Brunsdale, has
carefully analyzed the determinants of ITC vote outcomes. His profit analysis of ITC voting indi-
cates that the single best predictor of ITC determinations is the impact on U.S. industry revenue
of the unfair foreign practice, as estimated by a CADIC-type comparative static model. In fact,
his one-variable unitary approach profit model correctly predicted nearly the same proportion of
outcomes as his six-variable bifurcated approach profit model. The unitary model performed
better than the bifurcated model according to the Akaike information criteria. For details, see
Keith B. Anderson, Agency Discretion or Statutory Direction: Decision Making at the U.S.
International Trade Commission, 36 J. L. & ECON. 915 (1993).
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least three ITC commissioners. 26 Consequently, regardless of whether the unitary
approach faction or bifurcated approach faction is dominant, a high proportion of investi-
gations that are initiated pursuant to petition would be anticipated to end in affirmative
determinations.2
7
III. Innovations in the Economic Models that Support
the Unitary Approach.
This section examines two proposed innovations in the comparative static models
used at the ITC. The first innovation extends the analysis of the COMPAS subsidy spread-
sheet to take proper analytic account of the significance of export opportunities available
to U.S. producers. The second innovation indicates how a comparative analysis of dump-
ing should be performed when the U.S. market is characterized by Bertrand competition, a
form of oligopoly structure.
A. INCORPORATING THE U.S. INDUSTRY'S EXPORT OPPORTUNITIES IN THE
SUBSIDY MODEL
The current ITC staff COMPAS subsidy model, as applied to foreign production sub-
sidies, analyzes changes in the equilibrium within the U.S. market alone. The U.S. CVD
law, however, requires the Commission to consider the impact of the subject imports on
"U.S. production operations as a whole," including, naturally, those production operations
that serve U.S. export markets. 28 Consequently, any impact that subsidized imports have
on U.S. export sales must be taken into account in correctly estimating the full effects on
the U.S. industry as a whole.29 The existence of export opportunities lessens the impact of
subject imports. In addition to presenting the adapted model, this section also demon-
strates the potential significance of this innovation by comparing estimates obtained both
with and without allowance for export opportunities.
Export opportunities, which are not permitted in the current COMPAS subsidy pack-
age, are a significant feature of the world, and result in attenuated impacts on the U.S.
26. Three votes are required to obtain an affirmative ITC determination and the consequent AD or
CVD remedial order.
27. It is possible that because of its transparency and predictability, the unitary approach reduces the
expected cost of obtaining protection. On the other hand, the unitary approach does not allow
commissioners to exercise as much discretion in reaching defensible determinations as the bifur-
cated approach. As a result, there is less opportunity for political considerations or other extra-
neous factors to intrude on the analysis. Thus, the unitary approach tends to insulate the injury-
determination process from the more direct forms of political influence.
28. In the pre- and posthearing staff reports, for example, export sales are always included in report-
ing the U.S. industry's financial performance.
29. Export effects are incorporated in the Comparative Analysis of U.S. Equilibrium (CAUSE)
model, developed by Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan, and released to the public by Trade
Resources Company in 1992. The structure of the CAUSE model is documented mathematically
for the first time in this paper.
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industry.30 Foreign production subsidies adversely affect U.S. producers who themselves
trade in world markets through two distinct channels: first, subsidies increase competition
within the U.S. market through increased imports. Second, subsidies increase competition
with U.S. producers outside of the United States. The U.S. CVD law, however, requires that
the injury be "by reason of imports of the merchandise subject to the order." Accordingly,
only the effects that flow through the first channel are cognizable under the law.3 1
Increased U.S. exports, induced by increased, subsidized imports, must be counted because
they are a direct consequence of the imports.
To appropriately separate the import effects from the effects of increased competition
in the rest-of-the-world, it is necessary analytically to convert the production subsidy into
30. The ITC staff acknowledged the potential significance of U.S. export markets in correctly ana-
lyzing the impact of imports: "[I]n individual cases, the interaction of the U.S. market with
markets outside the United States may also significantly affect the impact of subsidies on the
domestic industry.* [Footnote:] *We understand the CAUSE model emphasizes such effects."
See RICHARD BOLTUCK AND SETH KAPLAN, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF U.S. EQUILIBRIUM: A GUIDE
FOR USERS OF THE CAUSE MODEL (1992). See An Economic Analysis of the Effects of Subsidies,
supra note, at 2.
31. The improper inclusion of effects attributable to the direct impact of U.S. production subsidies
in third country markets was at the heart of a GATT Dispute Resolution Panel's decision to
uphold a U.S. complaint against a determination to impose countervailing duties on U.S. grain
corn by the Canadian Import Tribunal (CIT, since renamed the Canadian International Trade
Tribunal):
The Panel noted however that whereas the CIT equated the world market price
decline with the decline and depression of the price for corn in the Canadian
market, the CIT did not attempt to make a link between subsidized imports and
the price decline and depression in the Canadian market. No positive evidence
was adduced on this point.
Panel Report, Jan. 1992, par. 5.2.6, at 26.
The Panel continued,
In the view of the Panel, the CIT's findings of injury and causality were them-
selves largely based on factors other than subsidized imports: in particular, the
factor of a dramatic decline in world market prices resulting in large part from a
United States subsidy under the 1985 Farm Bill. [footnote omitted] Clearly, if
there is a general and dramatic decline in world market prices for grain corn, this
will affect Canadian producers. It will affect Canadian producers even if Canada
does not import any grain corn from the United States, even if it imports grain
corn from third countries, even if it is not completely self-sufficient in grain corn
or, indeed, even if it is a net exporter of grain corn, as it was in some crops [sic]
years during the period of the CIT investigation. In each case, the Canadian price
for corn would still be directly impacted -- in a material way -- by the world price
decline. Thus the price depression experienced in the Canadian market would
have occurred in all such cases, and the imposition of countervailing duties would
be contrary to Article 6.4, which requires that price depression or prevention of
price increases caused by other factors must not be attributed to subsidized
imports.
Id., par. 5.2.9, at 27-28.
Since the united States itself petitioned GATT for relief from the erroneous Canadian CVD order,
it is reasonable to conclude that the interpretation of Subsidies Code obligations sought and
obtained from the Panel is in accord with U.S. law.
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an equivalent export subsidy targeted at the United States. The equivalent subsidy is
defined as the targeted export subsidy that would have an effect identical to that of the
production subsidy on the price of the subsidized merchandise in the U.S. market.32
The equivalent export subsidy would have two effects on production and sales of the
subject merchandise. First, it would encourage the diversion to the U.S. market of existing
foreign production that would otherwise be sold outside of the United States. Second, it
would encourage additional production. To the extent production increases, the (unsubsi-
dized) price of the subject merchandise outside of the United States would rise, since
quantity-supplied and price vary directly with each other.
The increased importation of merchandise that receives a targeted export subsidy
encourages U.S. producers to increase their own exports, and thereby insulate themselves,
to the extent possible, from the impact of the imports. U.S. producers respond in this way
both because of intensified competition within the U.S. market, and because the rest-of-
the-world market is more attractive to the extent the price of the subsidized merchandise
outside of the United States has risen.
The CAUSE model, or an appropriate adaptation of the COMPAS subsidy model,
must separate the effects attributable to the imports from those attributable to competi-
tion outside of the United States, and also recognize that export opportunities moderate
the impact of increased subject imports on U.S. producers. Such an adaptation requires
that both the U.S. and rest-of-the-world markets are modelled, and that market shares and
production shares sold in each market be arithmetically consistent
The first step in constructing an adapted model is to note the differing role played by
a production subsidy and a targeted export subsidy. As in the COMPAS model, three com-
peting, but Armington-differentiated, products are distinguished: (1) the domestic (U.S.)
like product; (2) the subject (unfairly traded) import; and (3) the non-subject (fairly trad-
ed) import. The structural difference between the equilibrium conditions for the two
types of distortions allows conversion of a production subsidy to an equivalent targeted
export subsidy. A production subsidy raises the supply price of the subject merchandise,
but reduces its demand price to all customers or end users:
D(P,. P,. P) D;(P, P.. P,) = Od(Pd) (IXA)
o.(Pdl, P. P,) D,(P. P., P,) - .(sP) (1)b)
D,(Pd. P.. P) O;(Pd, P,, P,) = QO(P,) (l)c)
In equations (1)(a)-(c), the left sides reflect, respectively, global demand for the domestic
(U.S.) like product (denoted by the subscript "d"), the subject (unfairly traded) product
(denoted by "u"), and the non-subject (fairly traded) product (denoted by "f"). In each
case, global demand is the sum of U.S. demand and rest-of-the-world demand (denoted by
"'). The right sides of each equation reflect the global supplies of each product. In each
32. For an intuitive discussion of the concept of an export equivalent subsidy in a single product
model, see Joseph F. Francois, Countervailing the Effects of Subsidies: An Economic Analysis, 26 J.
WORLD TRADE 15 (1992).
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instance, demand is a function of the prices of the three competing products, whereas sup-
ply is a function of the price of the product supplied. Note that the supply price of the
unfairly traded product is augmented by an ad valorem production subsidy at rate (s -
1 ).33 The objective of a production subsidy, of course, is to encourage expanded produc-
tion by raising the supply price.
In contrast to a production subsidy, a targeted export subsidy raises not just the sup-
ply price of the subject product, but also the demand price in the rest-of-the-world, i.e.
outside of the United States, which is the targeted export market. Formally,
Dd(Pd. P., P,) D;(P 4 . SP,. P,) = Q,(Pa) (2Ha)
D.(Pd P.- P,) D(P, P. P,) = Q,.P.) (2)(b)
O,(P
, , 
P., P) D;(Pd. P.- P,) - Q,(P) (2Xc)
In equations (2)(a)-(c), s is a targeted export subsidy at ad valorem rate (s - 1). In this
equilibrium, the subsidy is paid for exports destined for consumption in the United States.
That is, re-export of the subsidized imports from the United States to the rest-of-the-world
market must be precluded, or the subsidy ceases to be, in effect, targeted.
The second step in converting a production subsidy to an equivalent targeted export
subsidy is to logarithmically differentiate both sets of equilibrium conditions with respect
to their respective subsidy rates. Doing so results, in each case, in a corresponding set of
three linear equations that may be summarized in matrix notation:
A =C(s - 1) (3)
A. P C'(,f - 1) (4)
Equation (3) corresponds to equations (1)(a)-(c) and equation (4) corresponds to
equations (2)(a)-(c). In equations (3) and (4), p, is a 3 x 1 column vector of proportional
price changes, which are the "unknown" variables in each of the simultaneous equation
systems. The right sides of these equations, C and C*, are also 3 x I column vectors, and
contain the "constants" in the non-homogeneous linear systems.
33. Frequently, production subsidies are conferred indirectly, in the form of subsidies to the use of
production factors. In this event, a factor subsidy may be converted into an equivalent produc-
tion subsidy by multiplying the ad valorem factor subsidy rate by the share of total production
cost attributable to the factor, and then multiplying this product by the output elasticity of the
factor. An output elasticity is defined as the percentage change in use of a factor that is associated
with a one percent increase in production, at constant factor prices. For a thorough discussion of
output elasticities, see EUGENE SILBERBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF ECONOMICs: A MATHEMATICAL
ANALYSIS 262-67 (2nd ed. 1990).
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To illustrate the structure of coefficient matrix A, consider the value of the upper left
cell:
a,, = Ydnd * Y;rn; - Od (5)
Cells on the main diagonal, such as the upper left cell, contain a weighted average of
the own-price demand elasticities in the United States and the rest-of-the-world (denoted
by .... and "b' respectively, with the appropriate product-specific subscript), where the
weights are the share of total production of each product sold in each market (denoted by
'"Y" and ,y*C,).34 The production supply elasticity (denoted by "e") is then subtracted
from this weighted average.
Cells off the main diagonal, such as the cell immediately to the right of the upper left
cell, contain weighted averages of cross-price elasticities of demand, and do not include
supply elasticities:
a,2 = Ydnw - v~n! (6)
For the purpose of converting a production subsidy to an equivalent targeted export
subsidy, second-order small terms, i.e., terms that contain the product of the subsidy and a
price change, that would otherwise appear in coefficient matrix A, are properly ignored.
Linearization assures that these terms approach zero within a sufficiently small neighbor-
hood about the point around which the approximation is made.
Constant vector C, derived from the production subsidy equilibrium, contains a single
non zero value in its second cell, the elasticity of production supply of the unfairly traded
product, u. Constant vector C*, derived from a targeted export subsidy, contains values in
each of its three cells. The first cell, for instance, contains -yd "ndu . The second cell in
C* contains eu -Yd u , whereas the third cell resembles the first cell, with the appro-
priate changes.
The third step consists of two sub-steps. First, all market shares (in value terms) and
production shares (in quantity terms) are specified, and second, the market shares together
with appropriate elasticities are used to derive a consistent system of product-specific,
market-specific own-price and cross-price elasticities of demand. The results are then
applied in numerically completing the two linear systems set out above.
In general, an ITC investigation will obtain sufficient evidence to directly specify U.S.
market shares (denoted by "V" and the appropriate subscript) for the U.S. like product,
subject imports, and non-subject imports, together with the production shares.35 If total
expenditure in the U.S. market on all three products is represented by T, and total expendi-
34. Demand elasticities, by convention, are negative.
35. The production shares for non-subject merchandise are often not available as a product of the
investigation, and as a result the model should be tested as to sensitivity to the value of this share
within a reasonable range.
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ture in the rest-of-the world market by T*, then the ratio of T* to T may be expressed in
terms of the U.S. market shares, and global production shares:
=(L.)v . -(-$)v, . (L) v, (7)
" ; y; y;
T v. Yd y,
Note that Yu + Y = 1, and similarly for the other pairs of production shares.
Based on equation (7), the market shares of each of the three products in the rest-of-
the world may be calculated. For instance, Vu* is given by,
V.* .
v . T
Now, equipped with a full complement of market shares for both markets, a full
demand structure may be specified. 36 These elasticities are obtained through application
of the Hick's derived-demand relationships. For example, the own-price demand elasticity
for the U.S. product in the U.S. market, Tld, is given by,
r6. VA - Vo, v,o (V)
In this equation, the o's are Allen partial elasticities of substitution and is the demand elas-
ticity for the composite product, which aggregates all three sub-products. The other five
own price product-specific demand elasticities (two in the U.S. market and three in the
rest-of-the-world market) follow the same form, with the appropriate changes.
The cross-price elasticities are obtained in a similar manner. For instance, the cross-
price elasticity of demand for the U.S. like product with respect to the price of the unfairly
traded product in the U.S. market, Tldu, is given by,
r, = v.01* ,,) (10)
The other eleven cross-price elasticities of demand (five in the U.S. market, and six in
the rest-of-the-world market) follow this same form, with the appropriate changes.
The fourth step in solving the model is to calculate the equivalent export subsidy.
Since the equivalent export subsidy is defined by the rate that generates the same impact
on the U.S. price of the unfairly traded product, the solution requires setting these two
36. Keith Hall, head of the ITC's Applied Economics Division, Office of Economics, noted in his dis-
cussant remarks on this paper that modeling the non-U.S. rest-of-the-world market presented
the ITC and its staff with problems of data availability not presently encountered. Production
share data for both the subject foreign producers and the U.S. industry, together with U.S. market
shares, are typically available in current investigations. These data are required in evaluating
equation 7. The principal new data required are the production shares of non-subject imports,
which are not currently collected. In many investigations, however, the estimated rest-of the-
world market shares derived in equation 8 (which relies on equation 7) are not highly sensitive to
reasonable variation in the value of non-subject import production shares. In general, the
Commission staff should consider obtaining estimates of these production shares in future inves-
tigations in order to better implement an analytical approach that appropriately answers the
statutory injury question.
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price impacts equal to each other, and then calculating Ssob, the solved value of s. To solve
the linear systems in matrix equations (3) and (4), it is first necessary to invert the coeffi-
dent matrix A, before solving for the equivalent subsidy. In this solution, the individual
cells of the inverted matrix are designated by "aij'-
a- (s - 1)
The fifth and final step is to solve the vector, p, based on equation (4) and the export
equivalent subsidy, Sso 137
A ' (S,,, - 1) (12)
Thus, the impact of the unfair practice on the price of the U.S. product, conveyed
through imports, is the value of the first cell in the solution vector in equation (12), name-
ly, Pd (log derivatives or proportional changes are denoted by "A"). The impacts on the
U.S. industry's volume and revenue may be found through the supply response:
01 Ad8d (13)(2)
(?d Ad (e* d 1) (13)(b)
Correcting for the existence of export opportunities, and not counting injury con-
veyed through third-country effects of a production subsidy, can yield significant changes
in estimated effects, as revealed in a simple example.
Consider a 30 percent countervailable production subsidy. Suppose that subject
imports account for 10 percent of the U.S. market whereas the like product accounts for 80
percent. Fifty percent of subject production and 20 percent of non-subject foreign pro-
duction is sold in the U.S. market U.S. producers export 15 percent of their production.
Suppose further that the composite demand elasticities in both markets equal -0.3 and the
elasticities of substitution all equal 5. Finally, assume that all supply elasticities equal 4.
Based on this parameterization, U.S. industry revenue would appear to decline by 6.8
percent consequent to the subsidy, before the correction is made to isolate the effects of the
imports. Once the correction is made, however, the revenue impact is reduced to just 4.1
percent, which is less than the notional five percent materiality threshold that has been
applied by some commissioners who use the unitary approach.
Finally, the author has further adapted this model to account for transportation and
other costs that are incurred after the product has left the factory, but before it has been
delivered to the consumer or end user. This adjustment, although not complicated, is not
elaborated here.38
37. A slight and seemingly imperceptible improvement involves re-specifying the middle column in
the coefficient matrix A to include the second-order small terms.
38. Details may be obtained through direct correspondence with the author.
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B. BERTRAND OLIGOPOLY WITHIN THE U.S. MARKET
A common criticism levelled at the CADIC model of price dumping is that the struc-
ture imposed on competition in the U.S. market does not correspond to that actually
encountered in many investigations.
The CADIC model assumes structurally that the importer exercises some market
power in its sales of the subject merchandise in the United States, although a lesser degree
of market power than is exercised in the producer's home market.39 Thus, the price of
subject merchandise, both in the home market and the U.S. market, is determined by a
mark up over marginal cost.40
By contrast, however, the CADIC model treats the U.S. producers as a perfectly com-
petitive industry in the U.S. market. That is, the U.S. like product price in the United
States just equals marginal cost.
This structure is not objectionable in some investigations. For instance, when many
U.S. producers comprise the U.S. industry, but comparatively few producers account for
subject imports, the pricing structure built into the CADIC model captures reasonable
modelling abstractions. In other investigations, the segment of the broader market served
by the U.S. industry is itself at least as highly concentrated as the segment served by the
foreign subject industry. In such circumstances, an alternative market structure is dearly
desirable.
In a recent investigation, Professor Paul Krugman argued that the U.S. market struc-
ture was more appropriately characterized by Bertrand oligopolistic competition. 4 1
Professor Krugman's model was simplified for pedagogic clarity. A more robust version
requires substitution of a sufficiently flexible and realistic demand system for the linear
demand system that Professor Krugman set out in his paper. A constant elasticity of sub-
stitution (CES) demand system was used in place of the linear system to generate compar-
ative estimates in a submission prepared by Trade Resources Company (TRC) in the CNPP
investigation. 42
Bertrand pricing assumes that each firm behaves strategically under the belief that its
competitors will not alter price in response to its own price changes. An alternative form
of oligopoly behavior, Cournot pricing, arises if each firm believes its competitors will not
alter quantity sold in response to its marketing decisions. Bertrand oligopoly behavior is
39. If the home market is deemed to be not viable, then the comparison market is a third country
export market in which the foreign producer exercises a greater degree of market power than is
exercised in the United States.
40. CADIC ver. 2.0 introduced Cournot oligopoly among subject foreign producers, which limits the
degree of market power exercised by individual firms.
41. International Market Segmentation, Innovation and Competition: A Theoretical Analysis of the
CNPP Market, by Paul Krugman, submitted as part of prehearing filings on behalf of Kodak in
Certain Color Negative Photographic Paper and Chemical Components Thereof From Japan and
the Netherlands (CNPP), Inv. Nos. 731-TA-661-662 (final investigation, subsequently suspended
pursuant to a suspension agreement).
42. Volume III of Prehearing Brief: Economic Submission on behalf of Petitioner Eastman Kodak
Company, submitted by Seth Kaplan, Richard Boltuck, Paul Zucker, Jerry Hausman, and Paul
Krugman, Aug. 16, 1994, as part of prehearing filings in the CNPP final investigation, subse-
quently suspended.
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regarded as generally more appropriate than Cournot behavior when capacity restraints do
not limit quantity responses, and when price competition is plainly evident in the market.
It is well known that in the absence of any product differentiation, Bertrand prices
collapse to marginal cost. This result is known as the Bertrand paradox. 43 Product differ-
entiation, however, regardless of how minor, is sufficient to assure mark up pricing. The
usual CADIC assumption of Armington differentiation thus implies that prices will exceed
marginal cost.
Professor Krugman posited that two types of end-use customers purchase the prod-
uct. "Home" customers are dedicated purchasers of the product manufactured by the firm
in the home country, whereas the purchase decisions of "swing" customers are sensitive to
relative price variation. This framework permits national asymmetries to arise solely
because of different distributions of customer types.
The TRC CNPP model relies on Armington'differentiation together with a CES
demand structure to implement the basic Krugman framework. Demand elasticities fac-
ing the U.S. industry and the subject importer, respectively, are consistent with Hick's
derived-demand conditions. CES demand of U.S. swing customers for the U.S. product,
for instance, is given by,
In this equation, Sd is the quantity of the U.S. like product demanded by swing cus-
tomers in the United States. AUS is a constant calibrated to the composite level of demand
in the U.S. market. The Allen partial elasticity of substitution, U, relates the U.S. like prod-
uct and the subject import in the United States, whereas US is the composite demand elas-
ticity for the two products.
Although the revised CADIC model could be solved through linearization, it is equal-
ly tractable, and otherwise preferable, to avoid linearization error by programming the
model in software that solves non-linear equations numerically.44
The practical significance of Bertrand oligopoly in the U.S. market, in place of the
conventional CADIC structure, depends critically on the facts in an investigation. Even in
a situation where the Bertrand assumption is demonstrably better suited to the market
structure than the usual CADIC assumption, it may not generate substantially different
estimates. For instance, if under either structure, the magnitude of the dumping margin is
so great as to drive the subject imports entirely from the U.S. market, then the resulting
estimates must be identical.
Moreover, in the context of supporting application of the unitary approach, the esti-
mates are used to infer whether the actual impacts exceed or fall short of a commissioner's
subjective materiality threshold. For this purpose, two estimates that are both clearly on
one side or the other of this threshold contain the same effective information content.
Nonetheless, such a coincidence cannot be known in advance of applying both versions of
the model, and in light of the actual market structure, one or the other version's estimates
will offer greater credibility.
43. See for example, JEAN TRIOLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 209-211 (1988).
44. Examples of such software include GAUSS, GAMS, and MathCAD.
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IV. Conclusions
This paper has proposed two innovations in economic tools that are currently used at
the ITC in AD and CVD investigations, and relied on by at least some commissioners who
apply the unitary approach. These innovations by no means exhaust the possibilities for
further exploration and improvement. In investigations that cover high technology prod-
ucts, for instance, dynamic cost reductions attributable to cumulative production experi-
ence (learning-by-doing), might be of critical importance in any valid simulation of the
effects of import sales. Numerous other case specific modifications could be identified.
The innovations examined here, however, appear to be applicable in a sufficient range of
investigations as to merit general attention.
It is clear that ITC commissioners who would like to promote a greater reliance on
economic tools such as CADIC and COMPAS must remain thoroughly open minded with
respect to improvements that better match the exercises they purport to conduct to the
underlying markets they seek to understand.
Finally, this paper has not attempted to review the social wisdom of the unfair trade
laws from an economist's perspective, or from any other perspective. Virtually all econo-
mists disparage, with little qualification, the very existence of these laws. From an eco-
nomic practitioner's perspective, however, two basic questions are in need of continuous
study: Given the existence of the laws, is there a better or worse way of administering
them? What role does forensic economics have to play in this process?
